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1 Introduction 
For the last thirty years, high government deficits and government debt have 
been recurring problems in many, if not most, advanced industrialized 
economies. While economic theory provides the normative foundations for the 
occasional use of government deficits and, thus, the resulting debt, the levels 
observed in the last three decades are difficult to reconcile with optimal 
government policies. Following the two oil shocks of the 1970s, most 
countries emerged in the early 1980s having accumulated large fiscal 
imbalances and spent the early 1980s trying to restore public finances and 
repay the large public debts. Towards the end of the 1980s, a large group of 
European countries were getting serious about forming a European Monetary 
Union and, partly as a response to the inability of national governments to 
consistently consolidate their public finances on their own, debt and deficit 
criteria were included as an integral part of the Maastricht Treaty, leading 
prospective member countries to increase their consolidation efforts. More 
recently, debt and deficit criteria are, along with other requirements, key 
components of the Stability and Growth Pact and remain a point of contention 
among member states, as well as a recurring policy challenge in most other 
advanced economies. 
 
The current economic crisis has resulted in large government deficits (figure 1) 
and, as a result, substantial run-ups of government debt burdens (figure 2).1 
The reason for large deficits is a mix of slowing economic activity, which 
lowers tax revenues, and a continued need for government spending, both on 
its own and as part of fiscal stimulus programs. Governments are currently 
trying to formulate exit strategies, finding the right balance between exiting 
crisis policy and returning to a fiscally sustainable path for public finances 
without affecting negatively the chances of economic recovery. However, not 
all countries are embracing fiscal consolidation strategies. 
 
Running deficits and thereby accumulating debt is generally recognized as the 
appropriate government response to an economic crisis or recession, and can 
also be the results of war or of long-term investment strategies. However, 
running deficits and accumulating government debt also has costs, in particular 
when population projections for most advanced economies suggest an 
unfavorable development in the share of retirees relative to the share of the 
workforce. First, government debt and deficits entail substantial borrowing 
costs in the form of interest rate payments to debt holders, requiring either 
additional tax revenues or less government spending. Second, while it is in 
principle possible to maintain a government deficit without sacrificing 
intergenerational distribution, continuous deficits and large government debt 
will tend to benefit current generations at the expense of future generations, 
who are typically not well represented in the current political process. Third, 
but related to the other two, large government debt can have growth effects.
                                                 
1 See figure 5 for the set of OECD- countries analyzed in the paper. 
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Figure 1 The evolution of deficits and cyclically adjusted deficits, percent of 
GDP 
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Note: Deficits is net lending in percent of GDP. C A Deficit is the cyclically adjusted primary balance in percent of 
potential GDP. Average across sample countries. 
 
As shown by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), moderate debt levels appear to pose 
no great problems for economic growth, but once debt levels pass 90 percent 
of GDP, median growth rates fall by one percent and average growth rates by 
almost two percent.  
 
It is, therefore, important to know if it is possible to identify factors that 
impede or facilitate engaging in fiscal consolidation. Beginning in the mid-
1990s (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997), a large literature has tried to 
identify (a) factors that inhibit or promote the initiation of fiscal consolidation 
strategies; (b) factors that increase the likelihood that such consolidations are 
successful, that is, lasting; (c) which factors enable governments to respond 
(faster) to fiscal crises, and (d) whether such consolidation efforts have 
economic effects beyond stabilizing government budgets. 
 
While there is agreement in the literature on some of these questions, 
considerable disagreement exists regarding other questions. For example, as 
will be explained in more detail below, a consistent finding in the literature is 
that fiscal consolidations achieved through spending reductions have a greater 
chance of lasting, that is, being successful, than consolidations based on tax 
increases. On the other hand, while some find political factors to be important 
determinants of fiscal consolidation efforts (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1997), 
others find no role for political explanations (Mierau et al. 2007). 
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Figure 2 General government debt, percent of GDP 
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In this paper, I review the literature on fiscal consolidations, highlighting both 
main conclusions and existing controversies. Some aspects of fiscal 
consolidations and adjustments are well-developed, while others have been 
addressed only to a lesser extent. For example, while fiscal transparency is 
generally thought to be an important component in formulating timely exit 
strategies, as argued for example by Alesina (2010), very little research on the 
topic exists. Therefore, I carry out empirical analyses of the determinants of 
fiscal consolidations as well as policy responses to fiscal crises, highlighting the 
roles of fiscal transparency and political factors, in particular political 
polarization, on both the probability of engaging in fiscal consolidations and 
the extent of the response to large deficits.  
 
I find that fiscal transparency is associated both with a higher likelihood of 
initiating fiscal consolidations, both directly and indirectly: On its own, fiscal 
transparency increases the likelihood of observing a consolidation of the 
deficit, but the total effect of fiscal transparency also increases with the level of 
the cyclically-adjusted deficit, meaning that countries with higher fiscal 
transparency react to higher deficits by consolidating fiscal balance to a greater 
extent than countries with lower levels of fiscal transparency. In the second set 
of analyses, I find that countries with higher levels of fiscal transparency 
respond to fiscal shocks – large deficits – by cutting subsequent deficits 
significantly  more than do countries with lower levels of fiscal transparency. 
 
I also investigate the effects of a wider set of political variables on the same set 
of outcomes. Previewing some of the findings, I find no effects of coalition 
governments, in any direction, but some support for the argument that 
minority governments have a harder time achieving fiscal consolidation, 
reminiscent of the findings of Edin and Ohlsson (1991) – but in contrast to 
Alesina and Perotti (1995). The clearest impact of politics on fiscal 
consolidation efforts come from political polarization. The greater is political 
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polarization in a country, the lower is the likelihood of observing fiscal 
consolidations, the smaller is the reaction to a given structural deficit, and, 
furthermore, the less able is a country to react to fiscal shocks in a significant 
manner; in sum, the total opposite of the results on fiscal transparency. These 
results confirm and extend the theoretical and empirical findings of Alt and 
Lassen (2006a,b) that countries with higher levels of fiscal transparency have 
lower debt and deficits on average and that fiscal transparency decreases, while 
political polarization increases, the impact of elections on fiscal policy through 
political budget cycles.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces fiscal consolidation in 
the context of government budgeting and reviews the literature on fiscal 
consolidations, including a discussion of the Swedish experience in the 1990s. 
Section 3 presents the framework for analyzing institutional and political 
effects on fiscal consolidation efforts, and section 4 presents the data and 
empirical approach. Section 5 presents results, section 6 discusses the extent to 
which we can expect fiscal institutions and frameworks conducive to 
sustainable fiscal policy to improve, and section 7 provides a discussion of the 
empirical results in light of the broader fiscal consolidation literature and sets 
out some recommendations for policy options based on this. All data, except 
when otherwise noted, pertains to OECD general government. 
2 What works for fiscal consolidations? 
The positive literature on fiscal consolidations and adjustments focuses on 
three questions: 
 
1. What factors affect the probability of initiating a fiscal consolidation?  
 
2. What factors affect whether the consolidation efforts are successful? 
 
3. How do countries respond to fiscal crises and what factors influence 
this response? 
 
Overall, the realization and size of fiscal consolidations typically depend on a 
mix of economic, political and institutional circumstances, but in spite of a 
large number of studies on various aspects of fiscal consolidations, only a few 
stylized facts have emerged, partly due to the different samples employed, both 
in terms of time periods and countries included, partly due to different 
empirical approaches, including both different empirical methods and different 
data definitions. 
 
The strongest stylized facts are:  
I. The best predictor of a fiscal consolidation, typically measured as a 
sizeable decrease in the cyclically adjusted deficit, is the size of the 
cyclically-adjusted deficit itself. The higher is the cyclically-adjusted 
deficit, the greater is the probability of observing a fiscal consolidation. 
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II. Fiscal consolidations are more successful, that is, have a higher 
probability of lasting, when consolidation is based on expenditure cuts 
rather than on tax increases. 
 
In contrast, there is little agreement over the role of politics; while some 
studies find no or only a limited role for political factors (Mierau et al., 2007), 
others find that government ideology or coalition government status matters 
for the success of consolidation programs (e.g. Tavares, 2004). Likewise, there 
is little agreement on the role of fiscal rules or budgetary institutions and 
transparency; while Wurzel et al. (2007) find strong effects of fiscal rules, such 
rules apparently have no significant effects in a study by the European 
Commission (2007).  
2.1 Starting and successfully completing fiscal consolidation 
programs
As noted above, the best predictor of observing a fiscal consolidation episode 
is the current cyclically-adjusted deficit: the higher the deficit, the higher is the 
probability of observing a fiscal adjustment towards a lower deficit, reflecting 
the fact that countries rarely default on their debt and, instead, tend to respect, 
or is forced to observe, the intertemporal government budget constraint 
securing that government finances are on a sustainable path in the future.  
 
Similarly, a higher level of government debt also tends to increase the chance 
of observing a cut in the deficit (e.g. Mierau et al. 2007), but the marginal  
effects on the probabilities of observing a cut are typically not large. The effect 
of favorable economic circumstances, measured by economic growth or the 
output gap, is sometimes positive, as in European Commission (2007) and 
sometimes negative, as in Wurzel et al. (2007), or both. The same goes for 
inflation. The mid-1990s saw stronger attempts by EU countries to consolidate 
(Wurzel et al. 2007), in preparation for the EMU. Similar effects are observed 
for the size of the adjustment, conditional on having undertaken it.  
 
Obviously, initiating a fiscal consolidation program does not necessarily imply 
that it is successful. In fact, according to a recent comprehensive study of EU-
countries by the European Commission (2007), approximately one out of three 
consolidation episodes ends in success, where success is defined by the 
following condition: in the three years after the end of the consolidation the 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance should not deteriorate by more than 0.75 % 
of GDP in cumulative terms compared to the level recorded in the final year of 
the consolidation period (European Commission, 2007, p. 202).  
 
Turning a deficit into a surplus and, eventually, reducing public debt can be 
achieved by cutting public expenditures, increasing public incomes, primarily 
tax revenues, or a combination of the two. Does how a fiscal consolidation is 
designed matter for its success, that is, its persistence and ultimate goal of 
reducing the budget deficit and debt? Repeating the stylized fact above, a 
general conclusion of the literature, and probably the strongest result identified 
in the literature at all, for example by Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) and 
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Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) and confirmed by, among others, the 
European Commission (2007), is that consolidations driven by cutting 
government expenditures tend to be more persistent than consolidations based 
on tax increases or cuts in public investments. Furthermore, an early result 
based on evidence from OECD countries, reported in Alesina and Perotti 
(1997), was that most successful expenditure cuts were based on cuts in social 
transfers and government wages, but this result seems to be driven by non-EU 
OECD-countries, as no particular spending categories stand out as 
determinants of successful consolidation programs in EU-countries (European 
Commission, 2007, p. 226). That expenditure cuts are important for deficit 
reduction is also confirmed by the response from financial markets: While large 
fiscal adjustments and consolidations in general are rewarded with lower 
interest rates from financial markets, consolidations based on expenditure cuts, 
in particular those based on wage cuts and reductions in transfer programs, 
result in even lower interest rates (Ardagna, 2009). 
 
The qualification is that the success of a consolidation program is conditional 
on its legislative passage; we observe the consequences only of consolidation 
programs that are actually passed in the legislature, either through annual 
budgets, special crisis packages or both. In order for a crisis package to pass in 
the first place, it may be necessary to combine spending cuts and tax increases 
in a way considered fair or reasonable by (a majority of) voters. This 
observation can also help explain the question raised by Alesina and Perotti 
(1997): why, if consolidations based on spending cuts are so effective, do not 
all consolidation efforts focus on this? The reason could easily be that 
consolidation efforts focused solely on expenditure cuts, the incidence of 
which almost by necessity will fall primarily on those dependent on the state 
for their livelihood, can be politically infeasible, a point reinforced by former 
Prime Minister of Sweden, Göran Persson, in his account of the Swedish 
consolidation experience of the 1990’s (Persson, 2009). According to Persson, 
the consolidation package consisted of two-thirds spending cuts and one third 
tax increases, a mix necessary for popular support of the entire policy of 
consolidation. 
 
A number of additional determinants of success in fiscal consolidations have 
been identified (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998; Tavares, 2004; Ardagna, 2004; 
Wurzel et al. 2007; European Commission, 2007; Tagkalakis, 2009): First, there 
is ample evidence that starting from a high level of public debt increases the 
chance of successful consolidations substantially (e.g. Alesina and Ardagna, 
1998), possibly owing to the increased awareness for the need for stabilization 
in such a situation as well as a resulting general acceptance of measures 
required to bring about such stabilization. However, for voters to accept 
significant cuts in current expenditures and/or increases in taxes the 
government must be able to convince voters that (considerable) fiscal 
consolidation is the right choice in current circumstances; this requires some 
degree of credibility on the part of voters, an issue we return to below, and 
may also require a change in government if the incumbent government is seen 
as having been a contributing cause of the fiscal situation due to fiscal 
profligacy or its inability to handle government finances. 
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Second, there seems to be a size effect in successful fiscal consolidations. The 
larger is the initial fiscal adjustment, typically measured by the increase in 
change in primary fiscal balance, the larger is the likelihood of success 
(Ardagna, 2004); however, this result may be driven by the inclusion of non-
EU OECD countries, as studies based exclusively on EU-countries fail to find 
such size effects (European Commission, 2007).  
 
Third, the framework of fiscal governance can potentially play a role in 
achieving success in consolidation efforts. Countries that score higher on a 
fiscal rules index, measuring the presence, coverage and strength of numerical 
fiscal rules, have a higher likelihood of experiencing successful consolidations 
(Wurzel et al., 2007), as do countries that score higher on an index measuring 
budgetary procedures (European Commission, 2007); we return to the issue of 
fiscal transparency in more detail below.  Contrary to this, there seem to be no 
effects of whether fiscal policy follows a delegation vs. contracts approach. 
Hallerberg et al. (2009a) analyze whether delegation vs. contract regimes differ 
in the way they approach fiscal consolidations, including whether such regimes 
affect the probability of expenditure-led consolidations. They find that 
countries with strong delegation procedures have a higher expenditure 
contribution in fiscal consolidations, but they do not address whether the 
response, in the form of fiscal consolidation, to economic crises differ between 
delegation and contract regimes. 
 
Furthermore, recent analyses explore the effect of labor and product market 
regulation on successful consolidations, echoing work by Alesina and Perotti in 
the 1990s. For example, Tagkalakis (2009) confirms most existing findings and 
report negative effects of (levels of) government ability to interfere with wage 
formation and centralized wage bargaining procedures. While statistically 
significant, the quantitative importance of these results seems to be limited. 
Similarly, the European Commission’s (2007) study finds that labor and 
product market reforms, rather than their level, are important correlates of 
successful fiscal adjustments. Their labor market reform measure is based on a 
composite labor market index consisting of the unweighted average of 
indicators of employment restriction, unemployment benefit replacement rate 
and benefit duration. When the value of the index increases, which is 
equivalent to reducing labor market regulations, this constitutes a reform. The 
product market reform measure includes measures of entry barriers, public 
ownership, market structure, vertical integration and price controls in public 
utilities. It remains unclear which specific components of reform contribute to 
the consolidation success, but it is likely that both labor and product market 
institutions affect the economy’s capabilities for economic adjustment and 
subsequent growth, allowing for an increase in GDP for a given budget deficit.  
 
Finally, as already mentioned above, a crucial part of any consolidation effort is 
credibility: Is a fiscal adjustment really necessary for the entire economy in the 
sense that it can justify the related costs in the eyes of voters, or is it another 
way of furthering partisan goals?  In the literature, a number of factors have 
been suggested to increase government credibility, including the size of the 
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fiscal adjustments (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990), the composition of the 
consolidation package (Alesina and Perotti, 1997) and general economic 
circumstances such as the levels of debt and deficits (Perotti, 1999). While it is 
not possible to measure credibility in a general way, one interesting additional 
factor influencing credibility has been argued (Tavares, 2004) to be the 
ideology of the government in charge of the consolidation efforts. For right-
wing governments with ideological goals of smaller state involvement, the 
problem in convincing voters of the necessity of fiscal consolidation is that 
consolidation efforts focused on spending cuts fulfill also the ideological goals 
of the government and, therefore, voters can be uncertain as to whether 
spending cuts are introduced for the sake of restoring fiscal balance or for 
distributional and/or ideological reasons. Conversely, left-wing governments, 
who by definition value government spending more, will cut spending only 
when it is absolutely necessary, as it goes against their ideological interests. 
However, left-wing governments trying to consolidate by increasing taxes are 
prone to voter concerns about the true need for crisis measures similar to 
those experienced by right-wing governments consolidating by cutting 
spending. Tavares (2004) find support for this argument in an empirical 
analysis of OECD countries over 40 years: Spending cuts by left-wing 
governments and tax increases by right wing governments are associated with 
more persistent fiscal adjustments. 
 
The third branch of the literature looks at policy outcomes in the years 
following a deficit crisis, where a country is said to experience a crisis when the 
budget deficit is among the top 25 % observed among all countries and years 
in the sample. Alesina et al. (2006) use this definition and find, in a sample 
including both developed and developing countries over the period 1960-2003, 
in general that ‘stronger’ governments adjust more swiftly and more 
aggressively to a fiscal crisis, where ‘stronger’ is proxied by an indicator for 
presidential systems, in which the executive is not hindered by the possibilities 
of no-confidence motions from the legislature, and by a measure of so-called 
executive constraints, or veto players (Tsebelis, 1998), where it is generally 
thought that executives facing more veto players find it more difficult to find 
common ground when contemplating a policy response to the crisis.  
2.2 The Swedish experience: Consolidation and Reform 
following (Fiscal) crisis 
During the Swedish economic crisis of the early 1990s, government deficits 
increased to more than 10 % of GDP and government debt exploded from 
less than 50 percent of GDP to more than 80 percent of GDP in just three 
years. However, as can be seen from figure 3, since the mid-late 1990s, Sweden 
has experienced only a few, moderate government deficits and government 
debt has been brought down considerably.  
 
The good fiscal performance of Sweden following the primary consolidation 
efforts has been widely credited to the establishment of medium-term fiscal 
frameworks, allowing a three-year perspective rather than just focusing on a 
single year, combined with the introduction of top-down budgeting and overall 
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expenditure ceilings, or targets, with clear budget frames breaking the targets 
into a number of categories (Ljungman, 2007; Hallerberg et al. 2009). As 
expenditure ceilings are set three years in advance, this has created a demand 
for realistic and reliable forecasts, by themselves contributing to a better fiscal 
policy decision-making process; see Ljungman (2007) for a detailed exposition 
of the Swedish system of budgeting. 
 
While there is no doubt that the reform of the budget process has been an 
important factor in improving public finances in Sweden,  the Swedish 
experience is also an example of how difficult it is to ascertain the (causal) 
effects of fiscal rules and frameworks. As noted by Hallerberg et al. (2009, pp. 
117-9), Sweden provides “an example of a success case that managed to get 
out of its culture of weak fiscal discipline,” and as emphasized also by 
politicians actually involved in setting government policy at the time 
(Henriksson, 2007; Persson 2009), a strong and widespread sense of crisis was 
a key factor in the establishment of the medium-term fiscal framework in 1997. 
Consistent with the evidence cited above, the seriousness of the crisis was 
emphasized, and made credible, by the fact that spending cuts were being 
aggressively pursued by a left-wing (Social Democratic) government. 
 
However, as is obvious from figure 4, government deficits were already 
brought largely under control when the framework was implemented, marked 
by the dashed vertical line, and the evolution in the overall fiscal balance since 
then has not been markedly different from Denmark and Finland, two 
neighboring countries, with different fiscal policy frameworks.  While Finland’s 
deficit did not reach the level of Sweden’s, and Denmark was not hit by a crisis 
in the same way, both Finland and Denmark have run a surplus since the late 
1990s until 2009. 
 
In the end, while the reform of the Swedish budgeting framework has certainly 
not hurt Swedish public finances, it is thus difficult to establish once and for all 
whether the implementation of the fiscal framework caused the better fiscal 
outcomes or were a consequence of the improved culture of fiscal discipline; 
the most systematic studies of the introduction of fiscal rules, to which we 
return in section 6, suggest that most fiscal rules are introduced when the 
public finances are already improving, as was obviously the case for Sweden, 
and that the rules by themselves have little lasting effect on public finance 
outcomes.  
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Figure 3 Government debt and deficits in Sweden, 1989-2009 
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Figure 4 Government deficits in Sweden, Finland and Denmark 
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3 The political economy of fiscal consolidations 
Faced with a fiscal crisis, a natural response of governments is to cut the 
deficit, either by cutting expenditures or increasing taxes. However, even 
glaringly necessary fiscal adjustments or consolidations are often delayed, or 
implemented in inadequate ways. The reason for this is politics: If the 
government is afraid of voter reactions to large cutback in expenditures or 
dramatic tax increases, it may postpone adjustment. If partners in a coalition 
government, or different branches in a divided government, cannot agree on 
the distribution of costs, this can delay adjustment. In this section, I discuss, 
based on formal models and empirical findings in the literature, what is known 
about government choice of crisis policy and, subsequently, how political 
variables, including the form of government and political polarization, and 
fiscal institutions affect both government adjustment decisions and voters’ 
perception of it.  
3.1 Voters and Fiscal policy: Do we know what voters want? 
How do voters evaluate fiscal consolidations and adjustments? Do they reward 
governments for prudent action, or do they punish them for cutting back 
expenditures? Do voters react at all to government budgets? 
 
Governments seem to think so, based on the evidence on the existence of 
political budget cycles, where governments boost deficits, or reduce surpluses, 
by a combination of lower taxes and higher expenditures before elections. The 
consensus in the literature is that there is little evidence for political business 
cycles, that is, electorally-motivated cycles in economic outcomes such as 
unemployment, inflation or aggregate output. On the other hand, there is some 
evidence for the existence of political budget cycles, that is, electorally-
motivated cycles in government budgets; in particular, there is some evidence 
for the existence of conditional political budget cycles. For example, Persson 
and Tabellini (2003) and Shi and Svensson (2006) show that public finances in 
weaker democracies and countries with less broad information provision to its 
citizens are more affected by the presence of elections, and Brender and 
Drazen (2006) argue that these findings may be due to the inclusion of new(er), 
rather than weak(er), democracies. However, this phenomenon is not 
exclusively found in weaker and more recent democracies.  
 
Alt and Lassen (2006b) confirm the findings that within the group of OECD 
countries, there is no unconditional political budget cycle, but find that there 
within this group of countries is clear evidence of political budget cycles in 
countries with less fiscal transparency and countries that are more politically 
polarized. The logic of this is the following: running deficits are costly, and 
governments will do it only if they can benefit electorally. However, the 
incentives encountered by governments to engage in political budget cycles are 
not the same across regimes, whether characterized by differences in election 
systems, partisan politics or budgetary institutions, or exchange rate regimes. If, 
for example, fiscal transparency is high, voters can more easily distinguish 
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electorally motivated fiscal policy changes from changes dictated by the 
economic situation.  
 
Compared to the large literature on political business and budget cycles, there 
is surprisingly little work cross-country work on electoral consequences of 
fiscal imbalances. The few existing studies suggest that the fact that politicians 
supply such political cycles does not imply that deficits are rewarded by voters; 
in fact, a recent analysis by Brender and Drazen (2008) suggests no beneficial 
effects for incumbent governments from running budget deficits in developed 
countries. However, this is perhaps not so surprising in light of the findings 
reported above that no such unconditional cycles can be found in advanced 
economies. A number of challenges remain: First, it has yet to be investigated 
whether effects of fiscal balance on reelection probabilities are conditional on 
the economic, political and institutional context, including for example fiscal 
transparency, as is the case for political budget cycles. Second, if one takes at 
face value the current wave of theoretical modeling of the political budget 
cycle, the reelection decision on the part of voters also includes their beliefs 
about incumbent government ability, which is missing from current 
specifications, which, in turn, could lead to biased estimates.  
 
More direct evidence on voters’ evaluations of fiscal adjustments is available 
from Alesina et al. (1998). They argue that since fiscal consolidations are not 
always contractionary, voters have no a priori reason to dislike such 
consolidations. Examining voter response to fiscal balance, they find very little 
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that voters dislike deficit cuts – but, on the 
other hand, there is no compelling evidence that they reward it either. In fact, 
they find almost no significant effects of fiscal balance and adjustments on 
incumbent reelection probabilities across OECD countries, foreshadowing the 
results by Brender and Drazen (2008). This raises the puzzle why governments 
do not always stabilize, as the political costs of doing so seem limited. The 
reason suggested by Alesina et al. (1998) is that governments uncertain about 
the allocation of responsibility for the costs of fiscal adjustments may find it 
optimal to do nothing.  
 
Furthermore, as was pointed out above regarding the Brender and Drazen 
study, two caveats remain regarding the study itself: First, voter response to 
fiscal adjustments may be conditional on other economic, political and 
institutional variables. Second, as also suggested by the Swedish experience 
discussed above, the effect on incumbent government support following fiscal 
adjustment may depend on whether the current crisis is perceived to be caused 
by that very government.  
 
In the Swedish case, the Social Democratic government came to power during 
the crisis, and it was able to implement a fiscal consolidation package without 
the political baggage of having been implicated in the unfolding of the 
economic crisis. This is consistent with work on economic voting, e.g. Duch 
and Stevenson (2008), who show that attribution of responsibility for current 
economic conditions often falls on the executive, as voters have a difficult time 
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distinguishing the relative importance of external factors and incumbent 
government choices.  
3.2 Fiscal policy and fiscal politics 
Fiscal consolidation requires political action. Not all governments are equally 
ready or able to provide this kind of action. The reasons for this are many. The 
main theoretical framework for understanding these reasons originate with the 
work on delayed or insufficient stabilization due to disagreements over burden 
sharing, proposed in a seminal paper by Alesina and Drazen (1991). In their 
setting, a fiscal crisis is on-going. Two parties or fractions can unilaterally end 
the crisis, but in doing so they also incur the costs of stabilization. On the 
other hand, waiting also entails a cost, as the economy deteriorates under 
inaction. In this line of modeling, opposing political interests is a strong 
predictor of lack of stabilization. Studies in this tradition see political actors as 
agents for groups in society, without making explicit the link between these 
groups and the choice of political actors; when political actors delay 
stabilization, whether this is due to a concern about the welfare of the groups it 
represents, or is solely for electoral reasons, is left unspecified.2 
 
In the context of fiscal stabilization and fiscal policy-making, most of the 
interest has focused on coalition vs. single party governments and minority vs. 
majority governments. Since decision-making rights in coalition governments 
are not placed with one political party, such governments fit the assumptions 
of the delayed stabilization model. In this case, a coalition partner, by not 
agreeing on a stabilization package, exerts a negative externality on the other 
members of the coalition, as everyone bears the costs of continued bargaining; 
this is also the topic of so-called dynamic common pool problems, wherein 
debt accumulation, which can be interpreted as the opposite of consolidation, 
is accelerated by multiple decision-makers.  
 
In s seminal paper on institutions and fiscal policy, Roubini and Sachs (1989) 
find that countries with coalition (or multi-party) governments and minority 
governments have a harder time maintaining fiscal discipline than their single-
party and majority counterparts. Their reasoning, as in Alesina and Drazen, is 
that coalition governments find it hard to agree on the distribution of spending 
cuts, as coalition partners dislike cuts in their constituencies’ preferred 
spending. At the same time, minority governments can find it difficult to get 
the votes needed for fiscal consolidation efforts, as potential non-government 
coalition partners not necessarily want a share of the blame from the associated 
spending cuts.  
 
Both coalition governments and minority governments are much more 
frequently occurring in countries with a proportional election system, where a 
party’s share of seats in parliament is (more) closely linked to the share of votes 
is received, while this is generally not the case under plurality rule. As such, it 
may not by coalition or minority governments as such that lead to greater lack 
                                                 
2 A recent analysis of war-of-attrition in budgeting and fiscal stabilization is Andersen et al.’s (2010a) analysis of late 
budgets in the American states. 
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of fiscal discipline, but rather the underlying electoral system. Such arguments 
have been put forward by Persson and Tabellini (2003), who argue, both 
theoretically and empirically, that countries with plurality (also called 
majoritarian systems) are more fiscally responsible.  
 
As noted by Hallerberg et al. (2009), however, the empirical support for this 
line of the fiscal policy literature, sometimes called type-of-government 
(Kontopoulos and Perotti, 2002) is, at best, uneven. For example, basing their 
analysis on the Roubini-Sachs data, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) find that 
minority governments, but not coalition governments, are more likely to run a 
deficit; on the other hand, Alesina and Perotti find minority governments to be 
more, rather than less, fiscally responsible. The results in general depend on the 
sample of countries, on the period under study and on the empirical approach.3  
3.3 Political polarization and fiscal transparency 
The war-of-attrition framework can also be used to analyze the effects of 
political polarization and fiscal transparency on fiscal consolidation efforts.  
 
Political polarization is most easily conceptualized as simply the distance 
between political parties or factions on a uni-dimensional political scale, 
typically construed as the standard left-right policy space. As such, political 
polarization typically refers to elite, or party, polarization, rather than mass, or 
voter, polarization. In the fiscal stabilization model, polarization can be 
construed as the degree to which costs are borne unilaterally, or similarly, as 
modeled in Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen (2010a), the degree of congruence in 
preferences among political factions. In this sense, when political polarization 
is high it is more valuable to be able to decide on the allocation of costs, 
leading to further delays in stabilization efforts.  
 
Fiscal transparency concerns the availability of information about the 
government budget, as well as justification and independent verification of 
assumptions made. Conceptually, fiscal transparency captures the degree to 
which it is possible to attain a complete and accurate picture of government 
finances, both in the short and in the long run. In analytical work, this is 
typically modeled by assuming that the true fiscal stance of the government is 
unobservable to voters and fiscal transparency is then construed as the 
probability of observing the true fiscal position (Shi and Svensson, 2006; Alt 
and Lassen, 2006a,b; Andersen and Nielsen, 2010). Empirically, fiscal 
transparency has been argued to lead to lower debt (Alt and Lassen, 2006a), 
less pronounced electoral cycles (Alt and Lassen, 2006b), less pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy (Andersen and Nielsen, 2010) and lower borrowing costs (Glennerster 
and Shin, 2007). In the context of the delayed stabilization model, interpreting 
increasing transparency as a reduction in private signals about economic costs 
implies that greater transparency should be associated with swifter responses to 
fiscal crises. 
                                                 
3 Kontopoulos and Perotti (2002) argue for an alternative approach, based on measures of government fragmentation, 
enveloping both coalition governments and the number of cabinet ministries. They find that more fragmentation, in 
particular a larger cabinet, are associated more higher government transfers. 
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4 Data and Empirical specification 
There exists are large literature examining the causes of both the supply of and 
demand for fiscal consolidations. While the early cross-country literature on 
politics and fiscal policy, e.g. Roubini and Sachs (1989), focused on the 
OECD-area, more recent work emphasizes, in part due to greater data 
availability, large cross-country samples ranging from 1960 and onto the 
present (Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi, 2006). In 
themselves, larger samples, by providing more data points, facilitate more 
precise estimation of political and economic relationships, and at the same time 
such larger samples allow for an evaluation of ‘deeper’ causes of differences in 
fiscal policy such as electoral systems and rules. It is also true, however, that 
extending samples to include countries that may be fundamentally different in 
a number of dimensions, some of which are even unobservable, may make the 
basis of comparison worse, rather than better; if extending the sample to 
countries that cannot be used as basis for counterfactuals, internal validity of 
the estimates decreases. 
 
A similar argument can be made for not extending the sample period too far 
back in time: Again, while it is true that more periods of observation can lead 
to sharper conclusions about empirical relationships, the conduct of economic 
policy changes over time, and in response to particular experiences in particular 
countries, in ways that can be difficult to capture in an econometric model 
even allowing for country and year fixed effects. 
 
Finally, as discussed at length above, a large part of the more recent literature 
on fiscal policy determination has focused on fiscal governance, a concept 
almost non-existent until the late 1980s. Except in cases where fiscal rules were 
constitutionally set long ago, as is the case for the much studied balanced-
budget requirements in American state governments, the data collection on 
fiscal governance indicators did not begin until the early 1990s (e.g. von Hagen, 
1992) and it has been possible only in a few cases to reconstruct measures back 
in time; Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2009) construct measures of fiscal 
rules in the EU from 1985 onwards, based on surveys in 1991, 2000 and 2004, 
and Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) construct a database of fiscal transparency 
indicators in American state governments from 1972 onwards, based on 
surveys of state budget officials.  
 
For these reasons, I restrict myself to a sample consisting of established 
OECD countries, excluding more recent members such as South Korea and 
Mexico, in the period from 1989-2005, with the endpoint being dictated by 
data availability. The countries includes are listed in figure 5 below. 
4.1 Measuring fiscal transparency 
The empirical analysis uses a variant of the fiscal transparency index 
constructed by Alt and Lassen (2006a), which is based on self-reported 
measures of fiscal transparency for 19 countries taken from a 1999 OECD 
questionnaire sent to all Budget Directors of OECD member countries 
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(OECD 1999).   Independently, nine out of these ten variables became part of 
OECD’s Best Practices for Budget Transparency (OECD, 2001).   
 
There exists a number of measures of fiscal transparency, and relative to many 
such measures, this survey data has the advantage that it focuses directly on 
transparency, and is comprehensive.  However, relying on survey responses 
does have two drawbacks.  First, they are self-reported and some countries are 
likely to rate themselves too highly.  Second, the questions focus on formal 
rules and procedures that may differ from actual practice. Alt and Lassen 
(2006a) reports that their index correlates well with the subjective assessment 
of fiscal transparency in eight European countries reported by von Hagen 
(1992), and this is true also for a recent update of that index; Hallerberg et al. 
(2009) report that the Alt and Lassen-index is correlated at .81 with their most 
recent subjective transparency index. Thus, overall we believe this to be good 
source of fiscal transparency data that captures the main characteristics of 
transparency identified in the literature. In practice, we use a slightly different 
version of the Alt-Lassen index, suggested by Andersen and Nielsen (2010), 
that drops one indicator (for whether in-year financial reports are audited) in 
order to increase the coverage of countries. 
 
We also compare this index against more subjective estimates of fiscal 
transparency.  Case-study evidence is supportive of the rankings at the 
extremes. For example, Campos and Pradhan (1999) report on the transparent 
New Zealand system. The most obvious difference between von Hagen’s 
(1992) subjective assessment and our index is that France and Germany receive 
high subjective assessments but receive relatively low scores on our index. 
Also, Germany's budget process deteriorated in the 1990s (Hallerberg et al. 
2001), as more recent analyses stress (von Hagen and Wolff 2004).  Note 
therefore that any errors we made in our index would bias the results against 
supporting our predictions, given that both of these countries have relatively 
good fiscal records in the period studied.  Finally, Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
argue that Italy has a highly non-transparent system of fiscal reporting, and 
uses special accounts and off budget items extensively, which is a more 
negative assessment than is provided by our coding.  Again, this discrepancy 
would bias the results against our predictions.   
 
While no unique definition of fiscal transparency exists, a useful description 
from the IMF sees “fiscal transparency … as openness toward the public at 
large about government structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public 
sector accounts, and projections.  It involves ready access to reliable, 
comprehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable 
information on government activities … so that the electorate and financial 
markets can accurately assess the government’s financial position and the true 
costs and benefits of government activities, including their present and future 
economic and social implications” (Kopits and Craig 1998: 1).   
 
The literature also provides specific examples of transparent budget reporting 
procedures: “A transparent budget process is one that provides clear 
information on all aspects of government fiscal policy.  Budgets that include 
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numerous special accounts and that fail to consolidate all fiscal activity into a 
single ‘bottom line’ measure are not transparent.  Budgets that are easily 
available to the public and to participants in the policymaking process, and that 
do present consolidated information, are transparent.” (Poterba and von 
Hagen 1999: 3-4). 
 
The Alt-Lassen measure of transparency is constructed to capture four distinct 
characteristics of transparency in budgeting and fiscal policy determination, 
synthesized from the descriptive literature on transparency, including Alesina 
and Perotti (1996) as well as Kopits and Craig (1998) and Poterba and von 
Hagen (1999) quoted above. First, more transparent procedures should process 
more information, and, other things equal, do so in fewer documents. This 
speaks to openness and ease of access and monitoring. Second, transparency 
depends on content as well as just the release of information, implying that 
there should be a commitment to non-arbitrary language: words and 
classifications should have clear, shared, unequivocal meanings. Third, the 
possibility of independent verification increases transparency. Finally, the 
presence of more justification increases transparency, reducing over-optimism 
and strategic creativity in assumptions and forecasts.  
 
To the ten included indicators included from the survey, we added a measure 
of whether the financial statements are prepared using accrual accounting.  
These 11 measures are aggregated additively into a simple index.  In terms of 
the four broad criteria we outlined above, the index contains: 
More information, other things equal, in fewer documents  
? Whether non-financial performance data is routinely included in the 
budget documentation presented to the legislature (yes = transparent) 
? Whether special reports on the fiscal outlook are released prior to an 
election (yes = transparent) 
? Whether the government regularly produces a report on the long term 
(10-40 years) outlook for public finances as a whole (yes = transparent) 
? Whether the government is required to report contingent liabilities on a 
regular basis (yes = transparent) 
? Whether the government generally presents more than one 
supplementary budget to the legislature in each fiscal year (no = 
transparent) 
? Whether the government is required to make regular actuarial estimates 
for social security programs (yes = transparent) 
Independent verification  
? Whether the economic assumptions used in the budget are subject to 
independent review (yes = transparent) 
Non-arbitrary language 
? Whether the government uses accrual accounting in its financial 
statements (yes = transparent) 
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More justification 
? Whether there is a legal requirement that the budget documentation 
contain a projection of expenditure beyond the next fiscal year (yes = 
transparent) 
? Whether it is a legal requirement that the budget include an ex post 
comparison between projected expenditure in future years and the 
actual expenditures in those years (yes = transparent) 
? Whether the budget discusses the impact that variations in the key 
economic assumptions would have on the budget outturn (yes = 
transparent) 
 
There is considerable variation in the transparency of the fiscal reporting, 
ranging from an index value of 1 (Greece) to an index value of 10 (New 
Zealand) out of a maximum index value of 11.  Individual country scores are 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
As argued by Alt and Lassen (2006a), fiscal transparency is generally associated 
with lower deficits and debt. While they focused on results for an average of 
the 1990s, figure 6 shows the bivariate relationships between fiscal 
transparency and, respectively, deficits and debt, for the sample period used in 
the analysis below. For both fiscal policy measures, there is a negative 
correlation; if one disregards Norway, which is in a special situation due to its 
petroleum fund, the bivariate relationships are strongly significant, even if 
based only on 20 observations. 
 
It is worth repeating that if our transparency index overstates fiscal 
transparency in Italy and understates it in France and Germany, this 
relationship is possibly even stronger than it appears here. 
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Figure 5 The Alt-Lassen index of fiscal transparency in OECD economies 
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4.2 Measuring Political Polarization 
Political polarization can be measured in many different ways. Our main 
measure of party system polarization was applied to fiscal policy by Alt and 
Lassen (2006b), though for a different time period and in a binary form. The 
measure comes from an expert survey (Benoit and Laver, 2005, who build on a 
methodology introduced by Laver and Hunt (1992). Country specialists were 
asked to assign scores on a 20-point scale representing the parties’ priorities 
between raising taxes to increase public services and cutting public services to 
cut taxes.  Relative to other polarization measures, this has the advantage of 
being focused directly on the taxation/spending-dimension. Our polarization 
variable is the standard deviation of party-by-party mean raw scores on this 
rating for each country.  The index ranges from 3.5 (Finland) to 7.4 (US), with 
a mean of 4.9 and a standard deviation of .8. We note that there is no statistical 
association at all between polarization and transparency. This method does not 
take into account the relative size of parties when calculating the measure; such 
a weighted measure varies less across countries, but this does not affect results. 
The measure is static, i.e. unchanged over the course of the sample period, 
which, as is the case for fiscal transparency, obviously is a simplification but 
which does capture long-run differences in political polarization across 
countries.  
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Figure 6 Deficits, debt and fiscal transparency  
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4.3 Measuring coalition government and minority 
government
Governments can consist of one or more political parties. We construct a 
measure of coalition government which equals one if more than one party is 
part of the government and zero otherwise. This is based on a measure of 
government fractionalization, which is a Herfindahl-index measuring the 
probability that two randomly picked government members come from 
different parties. Thus, if government fractionalization is zero, the government 
consists of a single party, if it is greater than zero, the government is a 
coalition. 
 Minority government status is based on the vote share of government 
parties. If this is less than 49.9 % the government is classified as a minority 
government.4 Minority governments make up approximately 60 % of both the 
full sample and the sample with a deficit > 0. Coalition governments make up 
70 % of the full sample and 65 % of the samples with deficits > 0. 
 
4.4 Empirical analysis: Definitions and empirical 
specification
A fiscal consolidation is defined by the OECD as “a policy aimed at reducing 
government deficits and debt accumulation.”5 Obviously, any policy that aims 
at improving the (intertemporal) fiscal position of the government is by this 
definition a fiscal consolidation, but in practice the term is often associated 
with efforts aimed at reducing ‘too high’ deficits or ‘too high’ debt, with ‘too 
high’ depending on the situation; for countries observing the Stability and 
Growth Pact, the guidelines have been the familiar 3% and 60% rules for 
deficits and debt, respectively. 
In the literature, most efforts have been concentrated at investigating fiscal 
consolidations defined as an improvement (i.e. cut) in the cyclically adjusted 
deficit regardless of the current fiscal position. This is consistent with the view 
that countries that are generally following a prudent fiscal policy path will be 
less exposed when being hit by a fiscal shock, but it is analytically distinct from 
the question of which governments are able to consolidate in bad times, or 
from a situation with a primary deficit greater than zero. Table 1 shows a 
selection of definitions of fiscal consolidation and adjustment found in the 
literature. 
 
Summary statistics for all variables are provided in the appendix. Below, we 
conduct two different empirical analyses. We present them in turn. 
 
                                                 
4 In practice, the seat share necessary for a majority may be slightly less than 50 % owing to integer number of 
members as well as special electoral rules. 
5 OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=984, accessed February 2010. 
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Table 1 What constitutes a fiscal consolidation episode in the 
literature? 
OECD(2007)  
A consolidation episode starts if CAPB improves by at least 1 pct-
point of potential GDP in one year or in two consecutive years with 
at least 0.5 pct-point improvement occurring in the first year. 
Continues as long as CAPB improves. An interruption is allowed 
without terminating the episode as long as the deterioration of the 
CAPB does not exceed 0.3%of GDP and is more than offset in the 
following year (by an improvement of at least 0.5 % of GDP).  
Alesina and Perotti (1995) 
A reduction in the cyclically adjusted primary deficit (BFI – 
Blanchard fiscal impulse) by at least 1,5 % of GDP in any given 
year. A small reduction is 0,5% to 1,5%  
Alesina and Ardagna (2009) 
A period of fiscal adjustment is a year in which the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance improves by at least 1,5 % of GDP (to 
rule out small, prolonged adjustments, stimuli. Focus here: Sharp 
and large episodes. 
Alesina and Perotti (1997) 
One year in which the cyclically adjusted primary deficit falls by 
more than 1.5 pct. of GDP or a period of two consecutive years in 
which the cyclically adjusted primary deficit falls by at least 1.25 
pct. in both years. 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) Improvement of at least 2 % in one year or two consecutive years where the capb improves by at least 1.5 % in both years. 
EC(2007) 
A consolidation is an improvement of the CAPB of at least 1.5% of 
GDP, which is either achieved (i) in one single year (a cold shower 
consolidation) or (ii) over a period of three years where in each 
single year the improvement of CAPB is less than 1.5% of GDP 
and the CAPB does not deteriorate by more than 0.5% of GDP 
compared to the year before (a gradual consolidation). 
General fiscal consolidation 
The basic empirical specification for studying the initiation of a consolidation 
is  
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This formulation states that the probability of observing a consolidation 
depends on the cyclically-adjusted deficit, its interaction with political and 
institutional variables and additional control variables. The definition of 
consolidation follows the European Commission (2007), shaded in the table 
above. However, one problem in modeling gradual consolidation efforts is 
how to date explanatory variables. Given that the broad consolidation 
definition includes a number of policy decisions over a number of years, 
possibly by different governments, it is not at all clear how to model the 
decisions that lead to gradual consolidation. For this reason, we focus on 
so-called cold-shower consolidations only, defined as reductions of at least 1.5 
percent of (potential) GDP in the cyclically-adjusted deficit from one year to 
the next.  
 
Obviously, the need for fiscal consolidation is not always the same; this is 
partly corrected for through the use of control variables, as in other studies of 
the causes of fiscal consolidation initiations. However, such an approach does 
not allow the effect of additional explanatory variables such as output gap, debt 
  Studier i Finanspolitik 2010/4  25 
level and political and institutional variables to vary with the overall fiscal 
environment; for example, the debt level can affect the need for consolidation 
differently depending on the fiscal balance. At the same time, fiscal institutions 
may be more effective in securing fiscal consolidation when the government is 
running a deficit.  To account for such asymmetric effects, I distinguish two 
cases when estimating the model: the full sample and a sample defined by 
positive deficits, where the need for fiscal consolidation is arguably greater. I 
condition the sample on the actual deficit rather than the cyclically adjusted 
deficit is that the former is more visible and often the focal point of public 
debates about the need for stabilization, adjustment or consolidation, as well as 
the measure used for example in the criteria dictated by the Maastricht treaty.  
Response to crisis 
In the analysis of the policy response to a budget deficit crisis, we follow 
Alesina et al. (2006) who define a a country to be in a fiscal crisis if the deficit-
to-GDP ratio is above the 75th percentile of the pooled empirical density of 
their sample, and examine whether a crisis induces a change in the deficit in the 
years following the crisis as well as whether such a response is conditional on 
political variables.  
 
We focus on how fiscal transparency affects the fiscal consolidation following 
a crisis. Our analysis is similar in spirit to that of Alesina et al. (2006), but we 
choose to focus on a more limited pool of countries, to limit problems of 
comparability, and to focus on a shorter span of years, to avoid problems of 
parameter instability. Furthermore, in addition to the definition of a crisis 
considered in Alesina et al. (2006), who define a deficit to be a crisis if the 
deficit belongs to the top quartile of the sample distribution, we also consider 
two alternatives: whether the deficit belongs to the top decile of the empirical 
sample distribution and whether the deficit exceeds three percent of GDP. The 
reason for the former is that we wish to focus specifically also on major 
shocks, and the reason for the latter is that this accords with the deficit rule 
embodied first in the Maastricht Treaty and later in the SGP. 
 
Our basic empirical specification thus is  
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where ,? s it i t s itdeficit deficit deficit?? ?  is the change in the deficit from the onset 
of the crisis until time s. The deficit is measured as net borrowing by general 
government relative to GDP. Since our transparency variable is time invariant 
for the sample we consider, there is no separate effect of the index on the 
deficit, as this is subsumed by the country fixed effect. Additionally, we allow 
for common year effects, and we estimate the model by OLS, making it a 
standard fixed effects panel data model, and correct the standard errors for 
heteroscedasticity. We further enrich the model as specified above by including 
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additional economics covariates and additional variables capturing political and 
institutional factors. 
5 Results 
This section reports the results. We begin by considering the sources of 
observed consolidation attempts and continue by assessing the responses to 
major crises.  
5.1 What are the determinants of fiscal consolidation 
episodes?
Table 2 reports results for the causes of cold-shower consolidations, where the 
cyclically-adjusted deficit decreases by 1.5 per cent of GDP from one year to 
the next.6 Each pair of columns reports results from two probit analyses, 
differing only in the sample employed. The left column of each pair reports 
results for the full sample, while the right column reports results for a sample 
defined by the (non-adjusted) deficit being greater than zero as described 
above. The first pair of columns reports the basic specification, the second pair 
includes political polarization and its interaction with the lagged cyclically-
adjusted deficit, and the final two pairs include, respectively, coalition and 
minority government.  
 
In general, both economic and political variables are stronger predictors of 
fiscal consolidation when we restrict the sample to include only cases of actual 
deficits, when the demand for consolidation presumably is higher. The effect 
of fiscal balance is consistently positive, with significant effects for the deficit-
sample. The size of the cyclically adjusted deficit is also quantitatively 
significant, which is consistent with all other work on the topic. In 
specification (4), including fiscal transparency, political polarization and  their 
interactions in the deficit-sample,  an increase in the cyclically-adjusted deficit 
of one percentage-point of GDP from its mean level, evaluated at the means 
of other variables, increases the probability of observing a fiscal consolidation 
by 13 percent.  
 
Other economic variables, such as the output gap, inflation and even the level 
of debt, have only very limited effects. The output gap is significant only 
occasionally, and the quantitative effect is negligible, which is true also 
regarding inflation and the level of debt, despite their strong statistical 
significance. Elections seem to have a weakly significant negative effect, in 
contrast to the positive effect found in most other studies (e.g. European 
Commission 2007, Wurzel 2007), but in accordance with the significant 
negative effects observed by Mierau et al. (2007). 
 
 
                                                 
6 A naive application of the gradual consolidation definition (see discussion above) yields essentially unchanged results.  
Table 2: Determinants of cold shower consolidations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged one period:
Cyclically adjusted deficit 0,125 0,141 0,439 1,268 0,344 1,088 0,424 1,374
[0.055]** [0.077]* [0.273] [0.379]*** [0.245] [0.330]*** [0.272] [0.353]***
Output gap -0,011 0,026 0,01 0,109 0,013 0,11 0,013 0,107
[0.035] [0.042] [0.047] [0.049]** [0.050] [0.052]** [0.048] [0.052]**
Public sector size 0,017 0,033 -0,006 -0,017 -0,009 -0,013 -0,005 -0,016
[0.013] [0.020]* [0.015] [0.021] [0.016] [0.024] [0.016] [0.023]
Inflation 0,083 0,146 0,047 0,12 0,014 0,079 0,057 0,122
[0.022]*** [0.034]*** [0.027]* [0.026]*** [0.028] [0.032]** [0.026]** [0.035]***
Debt 0,007 0,011 0,012 0,028 0,014 0,027 0,013 0,032
[0.005] [0.006]* [0.006]** [0.006]*** [0.006]** [0.006]*** [0.006]** [0.008]***
Election -0,195 -0,414 -0,139 -0,336 -0,099 -0,35 -0,142 -0,358
[0.193] [0.245]* [0.201] [0.282] [0.209] [0.302] [0.207] [0.292]
Fiscal transparency 0,104 0,172 0,139 0,442 0,124 0,39 0,149 0,455
[0.068] [0.120] [0.057]** [0.080]*** [0.060]** [0.076]*** [0.055]*** [0.098]***
Fiscal transparency x ca_deficit 0,015 0,027 0,006 0,047 -0,002 0,038 0,004 0,037
[0.008]* [0.013]** [0.009] [0.021]** [0.008] [0.018]** [0.009] [0.015]**
Political polarization -0,623 -1,1 -0,608 -1,085 -0,602 -1,154
[0.182]*** [0.228]*** [0.207]*** [0.250]*** [0.197]*** [0.231]***
Political polarization x ca_deficit -0,044 -0,215 -0,029 -0,183 -0,025 -0,191
[0.050] [0.079]*** [0.044] [0.068]*** [0.048] [0.063]***
Coalition government 0,103 -0,244
[0.204] [0.307]
Coalition government x ca_deficit 0,088 0,121
[0.054] [0.114]
Minority government -0,204 0,006
[0.208] [0.279]
Minority government x ca_deficit -0,072 -0,227
[0.067] [0.097]**
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 283 173 283 173 268 161 283 173
Sample Full Deficit > 0 Full Deficit > 0 Full Deficit > 0 Full Deficit > 0
Clustered standard errors in brackets. * signif icant at 10%; ** signif icant at 5%; *** signif icant at 1%.






Table 4: Deficit Increase from baseline year to year s, s=1,2,3,4.
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Crisis (top 10%) -0,337 -3,833 -2,517 -0,385 -0,425 -3,997 -2,299 0,338
[2.028] [2.201]* [4.215] [4.954] [2.186] [2.087]* [3.972] [4.600]
Crisis (top 10%) x Transparency 0,004 -0,126 -0,398 -0,776 -0,067 -0,252 -0,557 -0,885
[0.061] [0.144] [0.213]* [0.263]*** [0.085] [0.174] [0.254]** [0.270]***
Crisis (top 10%) x Political polarization -0,323 0,199 -0,118 -0,411 -0,241 0,307 -0,064 -0,542
[0.470] [0.499] [0.954] [1.109] [0.496] [0.504] [0.930] [1.029]
Crisis (top 25%) -0,523 -1,425 -2,205 -2,681
[0.677] [0.981] [1.333] [1.486]*
Crisis (top 25%) x Transparency -0,088 -0,376 -0,758 -1,069
[0.048]* [0.093]*** [0.085]*** [0.208]***
Crisis (top 25%) x Political polarization 0,04 0,346 0,734 1,095
[0.111] [0.195]* [0.249]*** [0.395]**
Crisis (3% deficit rule) -0,439 -1,017 -1,778 -0,347
[0.710] [1.165] [1.253] [1.338]
Crisis (3% deficit rule) x Transparency -0,191 -0,578 -1,022 -1,198
[0.096]* [0.175]*** [0.182]*** [0.191]***
Crisis (3% deficit rule) x Pol. Polarization 0,157 0,459 0,91 0,719
[0.198] [0.347] [0.355]** [0.381]*
Observations 333 312 291 270 333 312 291 270
R-squared 0,34 0,44 0,54 0,62 0,34 0,47 0,58 0,67
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
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5.5 Additional results 
The results are largely unaffected by the exact configuration of control 
variables. Indeed, the country fixed effects capture other institutional 
differences (but not their interaction with crisis-measures). Measures of the 
business cycle, including the (filtered) output gap, does not change the results, 
but we note that fiscal consolidation efforts are muted by higher (cyclically 
adjusted) unemployment (not shown). 
 
While we do not consider the interaction of the output gap and fiscal 
transparency on fiscal policy, as it does not relate directly to the focus on 
consolidation of interest here, we note that Andersen and Nielsen (2010) show, 
on the same data set with the same definitions of fiscal transparency, that 
higher fiscal transparency inhibits an observed tendency for fiscal policy to be 
pro-cyclical in good times, but that it does not affect policy in bad times, when 
most countries carry out counter-cyclical fiscal policy. We return to this below, 
in our discussion of the impact of rules and governance on intertemporal fiscal 
policy. 
 
In contrast to Alesina et al. (2006), we find few effects of veto players, or 
checks and balances in the policy process, on fiscal consolidation efforts. The 
likely reason is that, compared to Alesina et al.’s sample, there are not a lot of 
countries in our sample with few veto players. We also note that, while not 
quite significant at standard levels, coalition governments, measured by the 
government’s degree of fractionalization, tend to achieve more in terms of 
consolidation for all time horizons, while, conversely, single-party governments 
do worse. 
6 Who reforms budgetary institutions? 
The literature on the adoption of budgetary practices is still in its infancy, and 
only a few papers address the choice of fiscal rules, fiscal transparency and 
other budgetary institutions explicitly, thereby providing the foundations for 
statements about causal effects (for example, Alt and Lassen, 2006a, correct for 
potential endogeneity of fiscal transparency using an instrumental variables 
approach). Establishing fiscal rules or independent fiscal authorities and 
increasing dimensions of fiscal transparency by definition requires incumbent 
governments to relinquish discretionary power of fiscal policy instruments and 
to give up informational advantages regarding the planning and execution of 
the budget. Fiscal rules, interpreted here in the broadest sense possible, differ 
in their scope and legal basis, from constitutional, such as the recently 
implemented German stabilization fund, over statutory rules, such as the 
Swedish rules enacted in 1997, to statements of political intent, such as the 
Danish Tax Freeze announced by the then newly appointed centre-right 
government in 2001. In all cases, however, such rules involve some loss of 
policy discretion on the part of policy-makers, ranging from strict limits on 
fiscal balances, as in Germany, to the potential loss of political capital, as in the 
Danish case.  
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For these reasons, politicians, in particular the executive branch, are rarely the 
driving forces behind institutional arrangements facilitating such loss of policy 
discretion. The causes of the establishment of fiscal rules and independent 
fiscal authorities, as well as increases in budget transparency, can be grouped 
into three: (i) externally induced factors, typically through gentle or not so 
gentle pressure from supra-national institutions like the EU, the OECD and 
the IMF; (ii) factors related to economic crises; and (iii) internal political 
causes. 
 
While many developing countries have seen pressure from international 
organizations such as the IMF and the large development banks to improve 
their fiscal governance, often from low levels to begin with, advanced 
industrialized democracies with reasonably sound public finances are less often 
subjected to direct pressure from the outside. One obvious exception is 
countries participating in the European Monetary Union, where the Stability 
and Growth pact requires member states to submit either stability programs, 
for members, or convergence programs, for non-members, which have 
resulted in medium-term budget plans in every country (Hallerberg et al., 2009, 
p. 56-7). However, as noted by Hallerberg et al., EMU-membership can 
explain directly only the development on such medium-term plans, but not the 
(variation in) the development along other dimensions. 
 
Related to (ii), an obvious starter for budgetary reform is a fiscal or budgetary 
crisis, for two reasons. First, crises and reform generally go hand in hand, as a 
country with a well-functioning budgetary process should be less likely to 
experience a crisis in the first place, and therefore has less need for reform. 
Second, a fiscal crisis increases the salience, both amongst politicians and 
voters, of public budgets. If the voters and the public at large can be convinced 
that fiscal consolidation is necessary, politicians will find it less costly to 
implement such consolidation measures, but support for such measures are 
less likely in times of economic peace. This is also the logic behind the result of 
Tavares (2004), explained in detail above, that fiscal consolidation efforts, in 
particular those based on expenditure cuts, are more likely to succeed when 
implemented by a left-wing government, as the consolidation in this case is 
taken to be a necessary fiscal strategy rather than a way of simply reducing 
government involvement in the economy, as it could be interpreted if carried 
out by a right wing government. Two recent examples of such crisis-induced 
institutional changes are the Danish move to a fixed currency in the early 
1980s, partly as a response to an economic policy leading Denmark to “the 
brink of the abyss” in the words of a previous minister of finance, and the 
Swedish consolidation in the 1990s described above.  
 
The “reform following crisis”-argument also has implications for the 
evaluation of the effect of fiscal institutions. In particular, a crisis reform often 
includes a number of initiatives, making it difficult to sort the relative 
importance of these initiatives and, furthermore, since the reform-following-
crisis argument presupposes some saliency of the economic crisis to begin 
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with, changes in political cultures of spending, even if they may be short-lived, 
can also make it difficult to attribute observed changes to outcomes to 
particular rule changes. 
 
Finally, reform may result from internal political causes, as noted by Alt, 
Lassen and Rose (2006) in the case of budget transparency. In particular, the 
prospect of future political competition, measured somewhat imperfectly by 
past levels of political competition, increases the likelihood of relinquishing 
discretionary power and informational advantages. The reason is simple: if the 
incumbent has vast discretionary powers, and the current opposition has a 
greater chance of being a future incumbent, current policy-makers could try to 
influence the room for maneuvering of successor governments by establishing 
or otherwise improving on independent oversight. However, if an incumbent 
is entirely certain to be in office in the future, independent oversight will only 
limit the range of policy actions with few benefits to show for it.  
 
The endogenous choice of whether to implement instruments of fiscal 
governance, also addressed in detail in Hallerberg et al. (2009a), though with a 
different focus, is a major challenge for both the academic and policy-making 
communities. Skeptics, including for example McCubbins and Moule (2009), 
argue that almost no fiscal institutions have been demonstrated beyond a 
reasonable doubt to have causal effects. In their study of fiscal institutions in 
American state governments, they argue that for example tax and expenditure 
limits, similar to expenditure rules found in many European countries, have 
basically no effect, partly as a result of efforts to circumvent them. They do 
remain somewhat optimistic, though, regarding rainy-day funds, to which we 
return in the final section. 
7 Discussion: Fiscal consolidations and Rules vs. 
discretion 
Fiscal consolidations do not happen at random. They are more likely to take 
place when cyclically-adjusted deficits are high and when debt is high, 
suggesting that most governments respects their intertemporal budget 
constraint. However, deficits and debt remain high in many countries, and 
current debate about exit strategies is exactly focused on the trade-off between 
beginning fiscal consolidation too early, making economic recovery difficult, 
and beginning it too late, or not at all, resulting in continued deficits and, as a 
result, a substantial build-up of public debt? While political polarization tends 
to limit fiscal consolidation efforts, I found no statistically and/or 
quantitatively important effects of whether a government is based on a 
minority, consists of a coalition of parties, or a combination. 
 
In this paper, I have surveyed (parts of) the positive, or empirical, literature on 
fiscal consolidation. In doing so, little attention has been paid to the other 
important functions served by the public budgets; for example, if one reason 
for having a large public sector in the first place is to carry out distributive 
policies, then fiscal consolidation has to be traded off against possible 
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distributional consequences. Similarly, as argued by Alesina et al. (2006), while 
few checks and balances in the political process can allow for prompt action in 
a fiscal crisis, the limited checks and balance may be felt elsewhere in the policy 
process. This holds also for institutional fixes: while balanced budgets 
amendments could go some of the way in reigning in budget deficits at the 
levels of national government, they would make stabilization policy, another 
key goal of government policy, very difficult to carry out. 
 
In the empirical analysis, I have shown that fiscal transparency tends both to 
increase the likelihood of initiating fiscal consolidations and to increase the 
response to large fiscal crisis. In contrast to formal expenditure rules, fiscal 
transparency is focused on improving the decision-making basis for fiscal 
policy, as are also independent economic or fiscal councils. The results add to 
the literature by suggesting a way in which the lower average debt and deficits 
observed in more transparent countries actually materialize: through prompt 
action following fiscal crisis. Empirical evidence from Andersen and Nielsen 
(2010) suggests a different, and probably equally important, way for fiscal 
transparency to affect overall public finances; they show that higher levels of 
fiscal transparency tend to limit the tendency towards pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
in good times observed in many countries. In this sense, fiscal transparency 
tends to counteract fiscal crisis by preventing them from occurring in the first 
place. 
 
Complementary ways of improving fiscal policy is an explicit focus on multi-
year budgeting, as that found in Sweden, or an explicit stabilization, or rainy-
day, fund, as recently implemented in the German constitution. In contrast to 
the Swedish rule, described briefly above and in more detail in Ljungman 
(2007), the German rule, described in detail in Kastrop (2009), makes explicit 
the conditions under which funds must be deposited or withdrawn from the 
fund and has a very strict escape clause. While it remains to be seen how the 
German rule will work in practice, existing constitutionally anchored rainy-day 
funds, found primarily in American state governments, do seem to facilitate 
intertemporal smoothing of public finances, reducing tendencies to pro-cyclical 
policies in good times, and thereby allowing for building up sufficient surpluses 
so as to limit the need for fiscal consolidations in the first place. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Summary statistics, no rule
mean sd min max N
Cyclically adjusted deficit -0.9438 2.92087 -7.4362 9.53656 331
Output gap -0.7044 2.45215 -11.446 6.73591 334
Public sector size 44.4669 7.76555 28.9407 64.7543 333
Inflation 3.20252 3.08534 -1.5545 20.6932 333
Debt 65.2322 27.6386 16.4897 140.67 307
Election 0.27171 0.44546 0 1 357
Fiscal transparency 4.38095 2.2387 1 10 357
Political polarization 4.90336 0.75666 3.49947 7.40758 357
Coalition government 0.69643 0.46049 0 1 336
Minority government 0.6369 0.48161 0 1 336
Deficit 1.91829 4.11346 -15.767 15.722 354
Table A.2: Summary statistics, deficit > 0
mean sd min max N
Cyclically adjusted deficit -0.6625 2.56383 -7.2217 9.53656 238
Output gap -0.9994 2.52989 -11.446 4.86388 240
Public sector size 44.3434 7.5477 28.9407 64.7543 240
Inflation 3.5 3.31621 -0.7292 20.6932 239
Debt 70.352 28.3453 16.4897 140.67 217
Election 0.27907 0.44941 0 1 258
Fiscal transparency 4.15504 2.07242 1 10 258
Political polarization 4.91715 0.75596 3.49947 7.40758 258
Coalition government 0.66529 0.47287 0 1 242
Minority government 0.6281 0.48431 0 1 242
Deficit 3.73226 2.81255 0.01255 15.722 255
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